Ten Misconceptions Concerning Neurobiology and Politics by Hibbing, John R
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications: Political Science Political Science, Department of
2013
Ten Misconceptions Concerning Neurobiology
and Politics
John R. Hibbing
University of Nebraska, jhibbing1@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Political Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Hibbing, John R., "Ten Misconceptions Concerning Neurobiology and Politics" (2013). Faculty Publications: Political Science. 68.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/68
Ten Misconceptions Concerning
Neurobiology and Politics
John R. Hibbing
Political science is far behind the other social science disciplines in incorporating neurobiological concepts, techniques, and
theory. In recent years progress has been made in closing this gap but many in the political science mainstream view the
movement with concern or even horror. Though a healthy dose of skepticism is appropriate and beneficial to the scientific
endeavor, negative reactions to viewing politics through a neurobiological lens are often based on fundamental misconceptions
regarding both neurobiology and politics. In this Reflections essay, I address ten of these misconceptions, including the beliefs
that biology is deterministic, reductionist, unnecessary, irrelevant, normatively dangerous, and ideologically biased. The goal is
to encourage a constructive dialogue on the relevance of neurobiology to political life—a dialogue that would in turn improve
research in the fledgling subfield and lead to innovations in political science by encouraging new ways of conceptualizing and
analyzing the variables at the discipline’s core.
I n the last decade, the discipline of political science hasbegun taking neurobiology (hereafter, shortened to biol-ogy) more seriously. From one perspective, the shift has
been dramatic. Stephen Engelmann writes of a “sociobio-
logical wave in the discipline,” including “a flurry of pub-
lications . . . in the national association’s main journals.1
Former editor of the American Political Science Review Lee
Sigelman remarked that one of the early articles in this
wave “set a new standard for political science in terms of
the media attention and public discussion it has pro-
voked.” He even wondered “whether it will emerge among
the most important articles the APSR has ever pub-
lished.”2 In considering the potential impact of the move-
ment, Evan Charney goes further, asserting that if the
claims of this new wave are true, “it would require noth-
ing less than a revision of our understanding of all of
human history, much—if not most—of political science,
sociology, anthropology, and psychology as well as, per-
haps, our understanding of what it means to be human.”3
From the perspective of those working in this area, these
assessments seem overstated. Interest in biology and pol-
itics is indeed high but it emanates from curiosity as much
as appreciation. Efforts to get the larger discipline to incor-
porate biological techniques have been only minimally
successful and many traditional scholars view the move-
ment as counterproductive and possibly dangerous. I have
heard from dozens of graduate students and junior faculty
around the country who are eager to pursue biologically-
informed research projects but who have been told by
older scholars that they should not spend time on such
efforts.
A fair summary of the current situation is that the move-
ment to integrate biology with empirical political science
has made significant strides of late, with additional polit-
ical scientists joining every year, but continues to encoun-
ter stiff resistance. Much of this resistance is not only
perfectly appropriate but welcome. The scientific process
demands scrutiny, criticism, and replication. Skeptical eyes
and second looks are essential, particularly when the
research in question is perceived as something of a para-
digm shift. In the case of biology and politics, however,
the resistance often springs from basic misconceptions
regarding the movement, its techniques and findings, and
even the nature of biology itself. Accordingly, I am delighted
to have this opportunity to address several of these
misconceptions.
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Selection of the specific misconceptions to address is
rendered more difficult by the absence of broad published
critiques. Questions have been raised in print about par-
ticular biological techniques such as those involving genet-
ics4 or neuroscience,5 but not about the overall enterprise.
Reservations are out there: we hear them at conferences
and lectures and we read them in blog posts and anony-
mous reviews but they are not typically in forums that
lend themselves to scholarly exchange. Thus, I cannot be
certain that the misconceptions I address here are those
most on the minds of critics. I have not intended to cherry-
pick only those misconceptions that are easily rebuttable
but if I have neglected to address an obvious concern it is
likely that those asked to respond will point this out to
me. That is the advantage of this format and I hope my
essay is viewed not as an attempt to alleviate concerns
with this style of research but rather as the beginning of a
printed conversation that could help to separate valid cri-
tiques from those that are based on misconceptions.
Misconception #1: Biology Is
Genetics
For better or worse, several of the more visible early arti-
cles in the recent movement, including the one referenced
by Sigelman, investigated a possible role for genetics in
shaping political orientations.6 Perhaps this is why many
observers are left with the impression that biology and
politics deals only with the degree to which political ori-
entations are innate.
In actuality, biologically-based research is not a syn-
onym for genetics-based research, as the following three
examples illustrate. First, research on sexual orientation
suggests that the likelihood of males being gay increases
slightly for each non-adoptive older brother they have.
Speculation is that pregnancy with a male fetus activates
certain immune-related chemicals in the mother that then
affect the development of subsequent male fetuses carried
in that same womb.7 Second, most monozygotic (MZ;
sometimes called identical) twins develop in the same cho-
rion (outer birth sac) but some develop in separate chori-
ons. Though mono-chorionic MZ twins are no more
similar genetically than di-chorionic MZ twins, they grow
up to be more alike with regard to a variety of traits,
suggesting an in-utero influence on those traits.8 Finally,
brain imaging research indicates that the posterior hippo-
campus (a part of the brain known to be involved with
memory and navigation) of a typical London taxi driver is
denser and has more volume than the hippocampus of a
matched non-taxi-driver and, controlling for age, is dens-
est among those who have been driving London taxis the
longest.9 Note that none of these examples has anything
to do with genetics yet each is heavily biological. Prenatal
environment is almost entirely about biology and the Lon-
don taxi driver research finds anatomical differences as a
result of the environment, not genetics. The nature versus
nurture debate is assumed by many political scientists to
be at the core of the biology and politics movement but it
is not even a debate among biologists because they are
much more accustomed to integrating genetic, non-
genetic biological (such as early development), and envi-
ronmental factors.10 Understanding the extent to which
predispositions become biologically instantiated, regard-
less of their original source, is the main goal of our lab and
of many students of biology and politics.
A popular area of study in sociology and other disci-
plines involves identifying biomarkers such as endocrine
levels, autonomic nervous system engagement, and brain
activation patterns that correlate with important social
variables. No a priori assumption is made that these bio-
markers are genetically derived. Indeed, researchers in this
area realize that the next steps are to sort out the causal
direction (does poverty elevate cortisol levels or do indi-
viduals with chronically high cortisol levels often end up
in poverty?) and to identify possible interaction effects
(does poverty have an especially deleterious effect on indi-
viduals with high cortisol levels?). Still, establishing a cor-
relational relationship between biology and social behaviors
is the necessary place to begin, in sociology as well as
political science. Evidence suggests that biologically instan-
tiated attitudes are different from those that are not in
that they are held more firmly and require different strat-
egies if they are to be changed.11 All this will be missed
should political scientists continue to ignore the degree to
which orientations have demonstrable biological signa-
tures. In sum, students of biology and politics are pursu-
ing a variety of important topics quite apart from the
extent to which political views are innate or socialized;
genetic or environmental.
Misconception #2: Biology Is
Deterministic
Relationships of interest to social scientists are often weak.
For example, the political attitudes of parents only mod-
estly correlate with the political attitudes of their 18-year-
old children. Jennings and Niemi report correlations of
.07 for views on business issues, .35 on prayer in schools,
.13 on tolerance, .18 on political trust, and .11 on interest
in politics, meaning that at best parents’ orientations
“account for” 12 percent (.35 x .35) of the variation in the
political opinions of their offspring.12 Similarly, socioeco-
nomic status (SES) is related to political views, but only
weakly. Even though high SES is typically found to be
positively associated with “conservative” political beliefs,
many low SES individuals adopt right-of-center political
stances and Warren Buffett is a registered Democrat and
strong advocate of a more redistributive tax code. These
sorts of low correlations and exceptions rarely lead people
to the conclusion that parents and socioeconomic status
are totally irrelevant to political orientations. In consider-
ing traditional variables like these, scholars and laypeople
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alike are willing to accept that the social world is extraor-
dinarily complicated and that uncovering modest tenden-
cies is informative and probably the most for which social
scientists can hope.
Yet, when biological variables are suggested as a possi-
ble explanatory factor, people suddenly seem less willing
to tolerate low correlations and inevitable exceptions. One
of the consistent findings of emerging research is that peo-
ple who report themselves to be sensitive to disgusting
concepts such as eating monkey meat or sleeping in a bed
in which someone recently died are more likely to oppose
homosexual rights and, more generally, to classify them-
selves as politically conservative.13 Whenever I describe
these findings in a lecture, at least one person in the audi-
ence will say, “that can’t be right: I am a liberal and a
supporter of rights for homosexuals but am very bothered
by disgusting concepts and objects.” The truth of the mat-
ter, of course, is that the finding can be “right” even though
the protesting individual does not fit the pattern. We all
know of smokers who live to be 90 and African-Americans
who are politically conservative but these cases do not call
into question the health risks of tobacco use or the liberal
inclinations of African-Americans as a group. The same
willingness to accept the existence of tendencies despite
countervailing examples should apply to relationships
involving biology. Skeptics seem to believe that for biol-
ogy to be politically relevant it must explain everything
and that, since it does not, its role must be negligible or
even fictitious.
A major reason for the application of unrealistic stan-
dards to relationships between biology and politics may
be misconceptions regarding the nature of genetics. Non-
geneticists, including reporters and many practicing polit-
ical scientists, often believe that variation in a given gene
is dichotomous (a person either has “the gene” or does
not) and that each gene serves only one purpose. Neither
belief is true.
When activated, genes create proteins that then play a
part in necessary bodily functions. For example, neuro-
transmitters allow cellular communication within the ner-
vous system and proteins serve as neurotransmitters, as
transporters of neurotransmitters, as receptors of neuro-
transmitters, and as enzymes that help to activate the genes
that produce neurotransmitters, transporters, or recep-
tors. Alterations in any of these functions may affect the
quality of neuronal communication and therefore socio-
political behavior. But nature is a notorious double-
dipper and any given neurotransmitter will be involved in
all kinds of activities. Dopamine, for example, has been
connected to risk taking and “acting out” behaviors but
also to muscle control and Parkinson’s disease. A gene
related to a certain class of dopamine receptors, say DRD4,
therefore, even if it is found to correlate with political
orientation, is not “a gene for liberalism” but rather is a
gene for a certain class of dopamine receptors that may
have relevance to a variety of downstream behaviors includ-
ing muscle movement, personality tendencies, and per-
haps politics.14
On its own, neither DRD4 nor any other gene could
do anything. Genes are collections of chemicals that remain
inert absent the introduction of additional chemicals (usu-
ally generated by an environmental event) that are neces-
sary to start the process of converting genes to proteins.
Moreover, even when the needed environmental stimulus
is present, all sorts of other genes must interact with the
target gene in order for it to be expressed and even when it
is expressed it will not have an effect without the presence
of the necessary substrates and transporters. This intricate
dance is why, with only a limited number of exceptions
(such as Huntington’s Disease), variation in the chemical
composition of any given gene is likely to account for only
a small portion of the variance in a phenotypic trait—
regardless of whether this trait is a physical characteristic,
a mental aptitude, or a social tendency. To cite a well-
known illustration, despite height being extremely herita-
ble, no single gene is responsible for more than a few
percent of the variation in height.
For all their contributions, Mendel’s experiments on
peas may have performed something of a disservice. The
traits Mendel identified were each the product of a single
gene and were essentially dichotomous. Many people still
seem to view genes in this fashion; a single gene is respon-
sible for a particular trait and the presence of a particular
genetic variant translates directly into one phenotype, its
absence, to another. In reality, genes do not come in just
two flavors and each gene typically influences numerous
traits. The traits of interest to social scientists certainly are
neither single gene nor dichotomous. One famous exam-
ple of a gene with more than two versions occurs in a
flanking region of avpr1a, a gene affecting vasopressin
receptors (avpr1a). When this region is very long (because
of multiple nucleotide repeats) vasopressin receptors tend
to be more plentiful (in voles and most likely in humans)
and offspring and mate-tending behaviors are enhanced;
when the region is of moderate length, vasopressin recep-
tors and offspring-tending behaviors increase only mod-
estly; and when the region is short, vasopressin receptors
are few and offspring-tending rare.15
Additional variation is introduced by epigenetic fac-
tors. Besides the DNA itself, nearby chemical com-
pounds, such as methyl and histone groups, affect gene
expression. These compounds are partially heritable but
heavily influenced by the environment.16 They can make
it marginally or substantially (or some level in between)
more difficult for genes to produce proteins. Finally,
all traits of interest to social scientists are quite sensitive
to the environment. Much interest in genetics these days
surrounds gene by environment (GxE) interactions and
this situation is likely to continue.17 Genes interact
with each other, with epigenetic factors, and with the
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environment in wonderfully complex fashions to shape
who we are mentally, emotionally, behaviorally, and
physically.
This digression into genetics was necessary because the
more people know about genetics the less unrealistic the
connection between genetics and political orientation
appears. It is understandable that those whose genetic
knowledge begins and ends with peas would be suspicious
of a possible role for genetics in human political behavior.
In Mendel’s world, a single, dichotomous, impervious-to-
the-environment gene yielded either green peas or yellow
peas. Transferred to politics, this Mendelian perspective
would mean that a single, dichotomous gene yields either
liberals or conservatives regardless of the environment.
But, as I have indicated, contemporary genetics is not
Mendelian and the genetics relevant to the social sciences
is complex, multi-gene, continuous, and interactive. In
sum, no geneticists, behavioral or otherwise, are genetic
determinists because being a genetic determinist requires
misunderstanding the manner in which genes work. The
determinism critique does, however, raise an interesting
question. If students of biology and politics are labeled
biological determinists because they add biological explan-
atory variables to environmental explanatory variables, are
those who include only environmental variables in their
models guilty of environmental determinism?
Misconception #3: Biology Is
Reductionist
Besides determinism, another “-ism” frequently employed
to describe biology and politics is reductionism.This term
is actually used in two different ways. In the first, students
of biology and politics are alleged to oversimplify causal
structures. Similar to Misconception #2, the charge is that
adherents of the biology and politics movement draw a
direct line from biology to politics and call it a day. This is
not the case and, in fact, I would like to suggest that
political scientists who do not incorporate biology are the
more “reductionist” in this sense of the term. If biology is
set totally aside, the discipline finds itself back in Skinne-
rian behaviorism. Environmental stimuli in the form of
anticipated rewards and punishments shape behavior and
that is the end of the story. It is difficult to imagine any-
thing more reductionist than theory built solely on envi-
ronmental explanatory variables. The organism engaging
in the behavior of interest becomes irrelevant because all
that matters is the environment.
Of course, most political scientists are not pure behav-
iorists in the Skinnerian mold. They recognize long-term
differences across people that are likely to lead to individ-
ual variation in response to specific immediate stimuli.
These standing differences have been variously called “ante-
cedent conditions,” “long-term predispositions,” or
“ingrained habits.”18 A recent study notes that when it
comes to politics, “you’ve either got it or you don’t.”19
Despite this acknowledgment, political scientists have been
reticent to investigate the nature and source of these long-
term influences, typically noting that such analyses are
“beyond the scope” of their studies or assuming that they
result entirely from socioeconomic factors.20
This is where the study of biology holds great potential
since it can help to identify the cognitive and physiologi-
cal signatures of political predispositions. As such, biology
and politics is more enriching than reductionist; it is not
content to take a pass on understanding the mechanics of
political orientations but rather seeks to explicate the rich-
ness of attitude formation. The requisite tools exist to
investigate the nature and composition of the long-term
predispositions that political scientists acknowledge to be
so important.
In pursuing such issues, however, students of biology
and politics are sometimes pronounced guilty of commit-
ting the other version of reductionism: the desire to move
all explanations back a step and then another step and
then another, through psychology, into biology, then chem-
istry, all the way to the universal laws of physics. What
would be accomplished, the critics ask, by looking at ever
more antecedent and distal variables?
It should be noted that scientists find this a strange
critique. When I have described this version of reduction-
ism to them, biologists’ response is often “. . . and that is
a bad thing?” To many in the scientific community, defin-
ing and investigating sub-problems and ever more distal
explanations is what scientific investigation is all about
and they see no need to apologize for it. Indeed, they
wonder what the alternative is. All empirical science—
social or otherwise—constitutes an effort to enhance under-
standing by finding relationships and explanations that
push farther away from the event of interest. Some critics’
apparent dissatisfaction with the biology and politics move-
ment may actually be with the nature of the scientific
process itself.
Moreover, the slippery slope argument—that if biol-
ogy is incorporated into the social sciences today, physics
must follow tomorrow—misunderstands the purpose and
direction of the biology and politics movement. The pri-
mary research questions of biologists deal with variation:
Why do some organisms get sick and some not, or why
do some organisms respond to environmental stimuli dif-
ferently than others? The movement addressed in this
essay is biology and politics, not physics and politics, and
many in the movement (certainly those in the research
group with which I am connected) are interested in
explaining variation across real people, not in reducing
the human condition to a set of mechanical laws. Accord-
ingly, we spend little time pondering the role of physics
in accounting for variations in political participation or
ideology. Ironically, some observers accuse biology and
politics research of not being reductionist enough. Engel-
mann’s central critique of my recent work follows these
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lines, arguing that its central flaw is a failure to be driven
by a one-size-fits-all theory of human nature.21 Is biology
and politics reductionist or not reductionist enough? It
cannot be both, yet both charges are leveled.
The “reductionist” criticism of the biology and politics
movement often is traceable to the belief that human life
is so intricate, wonderful, emergent, and rich that efforts
to break it down into biological components are hopeless
and trivialize the human condition. Those subscribing to
this belief do not accept that who we are is confined to a
couple of pounds of carbon-based neurons, support cells,
and organs resting on top of our necks, and that free-will,
self-awareness, consciousness, and metaphysics are biolog-
ical at root. They may be correct in this belief but the issue
needs to be resolved with empirical evidence and not wish-
ful thinking. The fact that so many scholars and laypeople
alike believe a non-biological component of the human
conditions legitimates and dignifies our species only
enhances the need for the biology and politics research
agenda. Broader recognition of the role of gritty biological
realities could inject much-needed humility into the self-
perceptions of homo sapiens. In any event, efforts to under-
stand human biological and social life should not be
abandoned—or labeled reductionist—merely because the
conclusions reached have the potential to be humbling.
Misconception #4: It Is Useless to
Peer Inside the Body
One of the most frequent retorts I hear is that the tools
being employed by students of biology and politics, from
brain imaging to candidate gene association studies and
from physiological tests to endocrinological assays, are a
waste of time. Peering inside the body or, as it is dismis-
sively called, the “black box,” is not necessary and does
not provide any information beyond that permitted by
traditional social science techniques such as survey research.
As I was reading a letter of recommendation for a recent
job applicant, I happened upon the following comment
from a leading political scientist: “It is not clear that biol-
ogy imposes that many constraints on social behavior.”
This claim is startling in its sweeping implications. It calls
into question not just the nascent biology and politics
movement but a significant portion of what is done in the
fields of cognitive psychology and neuroeconomics, not to
mention biology.
Do critics really believe that biological differences are
irrelevant to the manner in which each of us behaves in
social environments? If so, they must agree with actor
Tom Cruise that post-partum depression is not related in
any fashion to the massive hormonal changes accompany-
ing childbirth. If so, they must believe that sexual orien-
tation is entirely environmental. If so, they must believe
that drugs such as Adderall (that perform the quite bio-
logical function of adjusting neurotransmitter systems) are
incapable of treating ADHD and other disorders.22 If so,
theymust never have seen someone’s social behavior change
as a result of alcohol or recreational drug usage, coffee
consumption, or the biological changes resulting from sleep
deprivation. No two humans have exactly the same neuro-
transmitter systems. Since it is undeniable that artificially
manipulating these systems affects social behavior, what is
the basis for claiming that naturally-occurring variation
does not affect social behavior? Each of us is a distinct
biological organism and, as much as some might wish to
the contrary, these distinctions are relevant to all facets of
behavior. What are the grounds for believing politics will
end up being the only feature of all life on the planet that
is unrelated to biology?
Perhaps the primary reason for incorporating biologi-
cal measures into research on politics is that many of the
forces shaping orientations, political and otherwise, do
not reach the level of conscious awareness. Empirical polit-
ical scientists currently rely heavily on survey self-reports.
The basic approach is to ask people to describe their
reactions, moods, perceptions, and thoughts. The prob-
lem with this approach—and I should add that I use
survey self-reports extensively in my own research—is
that people simply are not aware of a significant portion
of their general emotional states or of their full responses
to stimuli.
Particularly when higher-order decisions such as moral-
ity and politics are involved, people often believe their
decisions and orientations to be the result of conscious,
rational reflection. Extraneous, sub-threshold factors might
be conceded to affect trivial decisions, such as which brand
of a product to buy, but the suggestion that these factors
are relevant to morality and politics is resisted. Nonethe-
less, the evidence clearly shows that politics and morality
are not confined to conscious, rational thought. People
sitting in a messy, malodorous room tend to make harsher
moral judgments than those who are in neutral rooms,
and disgusting ambient odors increase expressed dislike of
gays.23 Sitting on a hard, uncomfortable chair leads peo-
ple to be less flexible in their opinions than if they are
seated on a soft, comfortable chair.24 People reminded of
physical cleansing, perhaps by being placed near a hand
sanitizer, are more likely to render harsher moral judg-
ments than those who were not given such a reminder.25
People even can be made to change their moral judgments
as a result of hypnotic suggestion.26
Politics is no different. People whose polling place hap-
pens to be a church are more likely to vote for right-of-
center candidates and ballot measures than are those whose
polling place is a public school.27 People in Italy who
believed themselves to be neutral on an upcoming refer-
endum on the expansion of a nearby US military base but
who in an Implicit Association Test were quicker to asso-
ciate images of American GIs with negative concepts were
more likely to vote against the referendum than were those
who also said they were undecided but did not display this
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implicit bias.28 In other words, in certain situations it is
possible to know people’s voting behavior before they do.
Milton Lodge and his colleagues demonstrate the impor-
tance of hot cognition or automaticity in political judg-
ments.29 They show that political stimuli often produce
extremely quick emotional reactions that then affect more
deliberate cognitive processes such as memory recall, atten-
tion, and information processing. In other words, rapid,
pre-conscious responses color the manner in which peo-
ple reflect and ultimately act on political matters. People
tend to think their reflections are dispassionate and con-
scious, but they have in fact been heavily influenced by
forces operating outside of conscious thought, a concept
that receives further development in the important work
of psychologist John Jost on motivated social reasoning.30
Survey self-reports, as valuable as they are, are unable to
measure that which has not entered conscious awareness.
Biological measures can help. For example, in research
done in our lab, we used a standard disgust sensitivity
survey battery to measure respondents’ self-reported dis-
gust sensitivity.31 Later, we recorded changes in respon-
dents’ electrodermal activity (EDA, sometimes called skin
conductance) when they were shown disgusting images
on the computer screen. We found that self-reported dis-
gust sensitivity was not related to physiological responses
to disgusting images but that both measures related inde-
pendently to particular political attitudes, especially atti-
tudes toward gay marriage.32 In another study, while they
were attached to equipment that allowed us to record sev-
eral physiological responses (most notably, EDA), we
showed people a picture of Barack Obama. Later, we
showed respondents the image again and asked them to
self-report how the image made them feel. We then used
the self-report and the physiological response generated
by the image to explain variations in people’s job approval
of Barack Obama and found that each variable indepen-
dently predicted job approval.33
The message of these empirical studies is that survey
self-reports are important. Their effects do not evaporate
when physiological readings capable of tapping sub-
threshold responses are included so, apparently, people’s
conscious perceptions of their states and responses are
important. Perhaps more surprisingly, even when these
conscious reports are controlled, physiological responses
of which people are not aware also make a substantively
and statistically significant contribution to explaining polit-
ical attitudes. These results, along with the remarkably
inaccurate testimony of eye witnesses in criminal cases,
illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on self-reports.34
Misconception #5: Political Culture
Is Too Idiosyncratic to Succumb
to Biology
A common belief among some political scientists is that
issues and cultures are so different from country to coun-
try that generalizations regarding the factors shaping atti-
tudes are impossible.This belief is perfectly understandable
as variation across time and across cultures in the political
issues that are central and salient, as well as in the pre-
ferred means for dealing with these issues, is substantial.
Greece’s financial crisis beginning in 2010 temporarily
diverted attention from its long-simmering conflict with
Turkey over Cyprus. The decision of a private Danish
citizen to publish a cartoon depicting the prophetMoham-
med temporarily thrust relations with the Islamic world
to the forefront in Denmark. Two-thirds of residents of
the United States support the death penalty compared to
only 40 percent of the people in France. Conservatives in
the United States were isolationists in the years preceding
World War II but were interventionists in the years after.
A liberal in Australia advocates limited governmental inter-
vention in the economy but a liberal in the United States
supports activist economic policies. In light of quirks and
irregularities such as these, how could biology (or any
other broad force) be useful in understanding the vari-
ables that concern political scientists?
These idiosyncrasies, however, exist against the back-
drop of bedrock dilemmas of politics—basic issues that
must be resolved in any political system—and it is at the
level of bedrock dilemmas and not issues-of-the-day that
commonality can be glimpsed amidst cultural variations.
A complete list of these bedrock dilemmas is yet to be
compiled but a good start has been made. Social units are
never completely isolated from other social units, never
consist of members who universally play by the rules, never
enjoy unlimited resources, and never are in 100 percent
agreement on appropriate approaches to life. Thus, all
social units need to decide how to structure leadership
arrangements, distribute resources, secure protection from
out-groups, punish misbehavior of in-groupmembers, and
orient members to traditional or to new societal arrange-
ments. These and other bedrock dilemmas of mass society
are suggested in the literature.35 Whether the United States
should join the Allies to battle fascism in Europe is an
issue-of-the-day; protecting society from out-group threats
is a bedrock dilemma of politics. Whether convicted mur-
derers should be put to death by lethal injection is an
issue-of-the-day; handling norm violators is a bedrock
dilemma of politics. Whether to repeal the Bush era tax
cuts for millionaires is an issue-of-the-day; distributing
societal resources is a bedrock dilemma of politics.
The value of analyzing the biology-politics connection
depends on the type of question being posed. By way of
apologizing for a particularly vituperative set of reviews,
one journal editor wrote to me, “you know, the reason
they don’t like your approach is that they are convinced it
is going to put them out of a job.” If this is true, the worry
is misplaced. Some topics will benefit from biological tech-
niques but many others are best seen as culturally elabo-
rated. If interest is limited to issues-of-the-day, broad
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biologically-informed constructs are of less use; if, how-
ever, interest is at the level of bedrock dilemmas, the poten-
tial value increases. Biological approaches are not useful in
explaining why individuals deeply concerned with the secu-
rity of the United States advocated isolationism in 1935
and interventionism in 1955 (for this we need to turn to
research on framing) but biological approaches are useful
in explaining that certain people are more biologically and
cognitively sensitive to threats and that these individuals,
on average, will be more likely to support whatever poli-
cies they believe will best promote national security.36 From
this perspective, it does not matter that the label applied
to people who are particularly desirous of security (or the
preferred means of enhancing security) might be different
across space and time since the potential interface with
biology comes well before the labels of the day. A “national
security” argument will be more persuasive to some peo-
ple than to others and biology can help to explain this
variation.
Research on the connection of political views to per-
sonality traits, psychological tendencies, personal values,
moral foundations, and patterns of perception, attention,
and cognition shows remarkable consistency across cul-
tures.37 As biological variables begin to be tested in mul-
tiple countries, it is likely they will parallel these results.
Even though far fewer French than Americans support the
death penalty, a hypothesis derived from biology and pol-
itics is that, whether in France or the United States, those
who support harsher treatment for norm violators will
tend to share similar physiological and cognitive traits.
Just as people have deeper predispositions associated with
their personality traits, sexual orientation, risk propensity,
and exchange behavior, they also have deeper predisposi-
tions associated with their preferences for the proper res-
olution of bedrock political dilemmas.
Rather than debate whether each political culture should
be treated sui generis or lumped together with all other
cultures for the purpose of making broad generalizations,
the approach we are highlighting has the potential to iden-
tify the elements of politics that are unique as well as those
that are pan-cultural. Concluding a priori that there can
be no cross-polity commonality because so many cultural
differences are apparent is as much a mistake as assuming
that all politics is of a piece.
Misconception #6: The Study of
Biology and Politics Has a
Conservative Bias
Many liberals (in the American sense of the word) seem
bothered by the application of broad, sometimes biolog-
ical approaches to behavioral traits. They are sensitive to
the implications of the fact that people have different
characteristics. If such differences have a biological basis,
they may not be readily amenable to the societally-
constructed fixes favored by liberals. Many liberals are
particularly concerned that acknowledging the relevance
of biology to individual behavioral differences will legit-
imize the role of biology in explaining mean differences
across ethnic, racial, and gender groups. In a variety of
cultural contexts, liberals have been demonstrated to be
more concerned than conservatives with equality,38 and
to believe more strongly in the perfectibility of the human
condition,39 so it is not surprising that they would pos-
sess these sensitivities. Some liberals even point out that
Hitler and the Nazis believed in biologically-based behav-
ioral differences.
For several reasons, these concerns are misplaced. First,
if it were widely accepted that behaviors and orientations,
attitudes and aptitudes, were based in part in biology, can
we be sure that the treatment of those who are different
would change for the worse? The primary area in which
debate over the role of biology in shaping behavior has
reached public consciousness is sexual orientation, and it
is revealing that in this debate it is liberals who often
champion the position that behavior is biologically based.
Those opposing expanding homosexual rights are more
likely to believe that sexual orientation is the product of
environmental forces, often going so far as to believe it
possible to retrain gays and lesbians by sending them to
boot camps specializing in heterosexual conditioning. Lib-
erals, for the most part, are repulsed by such ideas and
typically believe that biology and maybe even genetics has
much to do with making some people gay and some
straight. Setting aside the intellectual acrobatics necessary
to conclude that sexual orientation is biologically based
but all other orientations are not, do liberals believe that
recognizing the behavioral relevance of biology makes peo-
ple more tolerant when the topic is homosexuality but less
tolerant when the topic is any other behavior? In point of
fact, just as acknowledging a role for biology in sexual
orientations promotes tolerance, so does acknowledging a
role for biology in political orientations. Those who are
looking for a reason to be intolerant will certainly jump
on biological evidence if it is available to them but, as the
case of sexual orientation indicates, their intolerance will
persist and may well intensify if the cause of difference is
believed to be environmental.
Ironically, if the role of biology were openly acknowl-
edged, the biggest increase in tolerance could come in the
area of differences across groups. Genetically and other-
wise, evidence reveals surprisingly large biological differ-
ences from person to person within geographical and ethnic
groups.40 Baseline differences in EDA and in endocrine
levels (such as the stress hormone cortisol) are marked.41
It appears that individual-level biological differences dwarf
mean biological differences from group to group. If
people can get past their knee-jerk reaction to the exis-
tence of behaviorally-relevant biological differences, they
would soon see that the existence of these individual-level
differences actually makes it more difficult to emphasize
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the differences between one group and another.The greater
the degree of biological variation within groups, the more
difficult it becomes to stereotype groups. Some liberals
paint themselves into a corner by thinking that in order to
minimize group differences they must deny the existence
of individual-level differences. This position should be
rethought both because it is wrong and because those who
deny the existence of any behaviorally-relevant biological
differences are fast becoming this era’s equivalent of the
flat earth society.
Indeed, refusal to acknowledge the full range of
individual-level behaviorally-relevant biological differ-
ences perpetuates damaging dichotomous distinctions. For
example, it is often alleged that variation exists only when
something has gone really wrong biologically, resulting
in an individual who is “abnormal” or “can’t tell right
from wrong.” Those not falling into the “deficient” cat-
egories are assumed to be biologically and cognitively
identical. In truth, an awareness that every person has
distinct, behaviorally relevant biological differences removes
the stigma typically applied to those who are labeled
“abnormal” and instead leads to the (distinctly liberal)
conclusion that there is no “normal.”
Regarding liberals’ desire to believe in the malleability
and perfectibility of the human condition, recall that many
biological traits are indeed changeable. Innate genetics con-
stitutes only one portion of our biological identities.
Behaviorally-relevant biological characteristics (such as an
intensely held political attitude) can be altered by persis-
tent environmental manipulations, such as propaganda,
but it will take more time than if the characteristic is not
biologically instantiated. Behaviorally-relevant biological
traits are sticky and in this sense constitute an individual-
level parallel of societal institutions. Political scientists cer-
tainly recognize that institutions, for all their inertia, can
and do change. Well, the same is true of biologically-
influenced behavioral tendencies. The belief that studying
biology restricts analysis to traits that are unchangeable is
a misconception.
Finally, the assumption that liberals are more likely than
conservatives to deny the relevance of biology and even
genetics to behavioral traits appears to be inaccurate. In
an intriguing study, Elizabeth Suhay and Toby Jayaratne
begin with the standard hypothesis that liberals will be
less likely than conservatives to subscribe to the belief that
genetic variables are relevant to behavior but find just the
opposite.42 Whether the behavior of interest is sexual ori-
entation or mental aptitudes, liberals are more likely than
conservatives to see the relevance of biology to human
behavior. Thus, the indignity frequently displayed by lib-
eral academics when the possibility of behaviorally-
relevant biological differences is raised does not seem to be
shared by rank-and-file liberals. My hunch is that, down
deep, liberal academics do not really believe biology is
irrelevant either.
Misconception #7: The Study of
Biology and Politics Has a Liberal
Bias
Many conservatives (in the American sense of the word)
seem bothered by the application of broad, sometimes
biological, approaches to behavioral traits. They seem espe-
cially sensitive to the possibility that the results will indi-
cate that conservatives are deficient. In one respect, they
have a right to be worried. Previous efforts to understand
the traits and characteristics of various ideologies have not
been kind to conservatives. Long ago, McCloskey con-
cluded that conservatism is characteristic of “social iso-
lates, of people who think poorly of themselves, who suffer
personal disgruntlement and frustration, who are submis-
sive, timid and wanting in confidence, who lack a clear
sense of direction and purpose, who are uncertain about
their values, and who are generally bewildered by the alarm-
ing task of having to thread their way through a society
which seems to them too complex to fathom.”43 Fifty
years later, the message was not much different: Block and
Block report that “conservatives are easily victimized, eas-
ily offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, relatively
over-controlled, and vulnerable.”44 Statements such as
these, combined with the predominantly liberal tilt of
academe, understandably put conservatives on guard. The
media do not help: The headline of a London newspaper’s
story on a study done by our lab was “Scientists Call
Conservatives Chicken,” when in fact the research merely
showed that conservatives are more physiologically respon-
sive to certain negative stimuli.
The prevailing notion of many conservatives and some
liberals seems to be that the only motivation for research
on the deeper basis of political differences must be to
affirm the political beliefs of the researchers or, more likely,
to demean the political beliefs of others. This assumption
renders research in this area particularly likely to be labeled
“junk science,” the definition of which seems to be any
scientific study containing findings disliked by the person
proffering that designation. People differ in an amazing
variety of ways and many of these differences correlate
with variations in political attitudes, orientations, and
involvement. Is it possible to discuss these differences with-
out casting aspersions, or being thought to cast asper-
sions, on one ideological group or another? Yes, but the
people doing the research must be more careful and the
people consuming the research must be less suspicious.
Consider two findings our lab has published on the
cognitive differences of liberals and conservatives. The first
employed a standard gaze-cueing paradigm in which par-
ticipants are asked to hit the keyboard space bar as soon as
they see a black dot on the screen. Before the black dot
appears, however, a face comes on the screen with eyes
looking one way or another. The extent to which the par-
ticipant is “cued” by the gazes of others can be measured
by noting the difference in response time when the eyes
| |



Reflections | Ten Misconceptions Concerning Neurobiology and Politics
482 Perspectives on Politics
are looking away from rather than toward the place where
the black dot eventually makes its appearance. Even though
participants are told that the face and eyes have nothing to
do with where the dot will appear, self-professed liberals
are more affected by gaze cues than are conservatives.45 In
the second study we provided evidence that, when a col-
lage of images is presented on the computer screen and
eye tracking technology is used to record the specific parts
of the collage at which participants tend to look, conser-
vatives spend more time than liberals attending to the
negative images (wrecked cars, messy toilets, houses on
fire, etc.) than to the positive images (beach balls, sunsets,
happy people, etc.).46
Are these findings demeaning to conservatives? It would
be possible to spin them that way. To wit: “Conservatives
are oblivious and insensitive to the people around them,
apparently unaffected by the most basic social cues. More-
over, they fixate on the negative aspects of life, obsessing
over threats and dangers when they could be appreciating
beauty and joy. They are emotionally distant pessimists.”
But the door swings both ways and these same findings
could be employed to conclude that “liberals are lem-
mings and Pollyannas. They mindlessly follow the lead of
others, even when doing so is misleading. Further, they
naively ignore obvious dangers in order to indulge their
hedonistic tendencies. Liberals just don’t get it.”
In truth, none of these cognitive patterns is necessarily
negative.Conservativesmay attendmore tonegative images
but they are more optimistic than liberals even after con-
trolling for SES,47 and liberals may score high on hedo-
nism but they are more empathetic toward other people.48
Any tendencycanbeoverdonebut there isno reason toattach
value judgments to every tendency, to assume those con-
ducting the researchmusthaveulteriormotives, or tobecome
ideologically defensive. It is interesting that when the gaze-
cuing task is described in the abstract, liberals generally
believe people should be sensitive to the gaze of others (pre-
sumably to demonstrate being in tune with the people
around them) and conservatives generally believe people
should not be (presumably to facilitate independence of
thought) so empirical researchappears to confirmthedesired
traits of particular ideological groups. Similarly, personal-
ity researchers find that conservatives consistently score
higher than liberals onconscientiousness and loweronopen-
ness to unspecifiednew experiences.49 Conservatives some-
times bristle at the latter finding but it is likely that if
conservativeswere asked to describe themselves a high com-
fort levelwith the tried and true as opposed to the unknown
would be an important part of their self-image.
Biological andpsychological research is showing that con-
servative individuals are deeply different from liberal indi-
viduals. Given that biological measures are continuous
andmultifaceted, one of theirmany strengths is in showing
that political orientations are not reducible to merely two
groups (liberals and conservatives) but rather consist of an
array of dimensions, moderates, libertarians, and apathet-
ics. Acknowledging deeper differences across the political
spectra should not be taken to imply that certain political
groups are therefore better or worse than others. Everyone
needs to develop thicker skin when deep-seated cognitive
andbiological differences arebeingdiscussed—andresearch-
ers need to be extra vigilant to use designs and language
that are as neutral as possible. If the past is any indication,
readerswill not be reluctant to let us knowwhen theybelieve
we have not been sufficiently vigilant.
Misconception #8: The Study of
Biology and Politics Seeks to Replace
Traditional Political Science
Thismisconception canbe addressed relatively quickly.The
goal of the biology and politics movement is not to convert
all political scientists to the study of biology. Asmentioned
earlier, many of the questions political scientists seek to
answer will not be clarified by the adoption of biological
techniques and approaches. We need researchers who will
continue to conduct research with the methods long-
employed by political scientists. The biological turn is best
seen as a fruitful addition that, when used alongside tradi-
tional social science approaches, holds substantial poten-
tial. It does indeed suggest alterations in the way politics
has been viewed—but new perspectives are beneficial.
At the annual meeting of the International Society of
Political Psychology a few years ago, I had the opportu-
nity to hear a presentation by leading psychologist John
Cacioppo. His topic was depression and the matter-of-
fact way he considered the topic from an incredible vari-
ety of approaches was refreshing. After describing the
history of depression and the once-dominant influence of
Freudian psychoanalysis, he addressed numerous social and
environmental correlates of depression, then turned to the
role of biology, including endocrinology, physiology, and
neurology, before finishing with reference to twin studies
and possible candidate gene associations. Along the way,
he mentioned policy implications of research on depres-
sion, both in terms of patient treatment and possible stat-
utory changes. The biological and genetic portions of the
presentation were offered in conjunction with environ-
mental factors and fit seamlessly into the larger picture.
There were no gasps from the audience at the mention of
biology, no expressed fears of an attempted hostile take-
over by the life sciences, and no accusations of biological
determinism. Cacioppo’s impressively broad approach to
the topic of depression serves as my ideal for political
science: a discipline in which biology is an important part
of what we do but is kept in proper perspective.
The hope that this vision might be realized is bol-
stered by the history of the introduction of rational choice
or formal theory into the discipline of political science. I
remember the early days of that movement and the neg-
ative reactions to it. The similarity of the complaints
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raised then to those being raised now with regard to
biology and politics is difficult to miss. Early practition-
ers of rational choice were viewed as alien and possibly
threatening. They spoke a foreign language—albeit of
axioms, proofs, and calculus rather than of genes, physi-
ology, and neuroscience—and were accused of trying to
take over the discipline and failing to appreciate the com-
plexities of real politics. Those outside the movement
alleged that, even if the suggested new direction was use-
ful, too much retooling would be involved. It was thought
rational choice approaches demeaned the richness of the
human condition.
Today, rational choice is mostly incorporated into polit-
ical science. Formal theoretical approaches are commonly
integrated with earlier styles of empirical political science.
For the most part, this confluence is now a relatively nor-
mal and accepted part of graduate training and research
agendas. The phrase rational choice is not even used that
much any more and current graduate students probably
would be mystified that there was once such a tumult. It
remains to be seen the extent to which the trajectory of
the biology and politics movement will parallel that of
rational choice. After all, assumptions of rationality tend
to downplay individual differences while the biology and
politics movement, as I see it, highlights these differences.
Still, biology may eventually be seen as much less threat-
ening and different than in appears now. The jobs of those
who choose not to adopt biological approaches are not in
jeopardy and the long-run goal is for as wide a variety of
techniques as possible to be placed in the service of greater
political knowledge and understanding.50
Misconception #9: The Study of
Biology and Politics Is Devoid of
Policy Implications
Perspectives on Politics was born of a desire to offer a forum
for political scientists to speak more directly to real-world
policy issues. As such, the misconception that biology and
politics has nothing to contribute to practical politics is of
special concern here. This topic returns us to the miscon-
ception that biology is all genetics, that genetics is fixed at
birth and that therefore, to the extent the claims of biol-
ogy and politics are correct, they suggest everything is
predestined. If it were true that people are born liberals,
conservatives, or apathetics and nothing could be done
about it, campaigns and consulting firms would be ren-
dered unnecessary. In such a world, policy outcomes could
not be debated meaningfully, gridlock would be pre-
ordained, and political scientists would have little civic
purpose.
As I hope to have made clear by now, this is not the way
biology operates. Much of biology is environmentally
shaped and changeable, if inertial. The evidence suggests
that some people are relatively locked in to their political
views, just as they are relatively locked in to their person-
ality traits. This same evidence, however, indicates that
many people are largely devoid of politically relevant bio-
logical or psychological predispositions. In our own research
on physiology, the results often make much more sense
when we exclude the many people who are not clearly on
one side of the political spectrum or the other. This pat-
tern encourages speculation that many people’s political
orientations are not the result of strong and broad predis-
positions but it may seem as though they are because indi-
viduals who are predisposed tend to play a role in the
political arena far exceeding their numbers.
Research on biology and politics does not suggest that
political change is impossible. Indeed, it holds the prom-
ise of making change more likely, by identifying the strat-
egies that are most promising for bringing about change
in any given individual, perhaps through media framing,
persuasion styles, and micro-targeting. By way of illustra-
tion, we are currently involved in a project that reports an
inverse correlation between cortisol (a stress hormone) lev-
els and political participation.51 On the basis of this find-
ing we go on to hypothesize that non-voters with high
cortisol levels will respond to different get-out-the-vote
strategies than non-voters with low cortisol levels. For exam-
ple, it may be that increasing turnout rates among high
cortisol individuals could best be accomplished not by
appeals to civic duty (since a lack of civic feelings is not
the reason they are reluctant to vote) but rather by adopt-
ing and encouraging less stressful voting procedures such
as mail-in ballots. Increasing voter turnout by tailoring
approaches to the biological traits of particular non-
voting individuals is just one example of the concrete poten-
tial of placing politics in the context of the life sciences.
Another potential contribution is that evidence of the
depth of political orientations could lead to more toler-
ance and less acrimony in the political arena.52 People
need to recognize that their political opponents are not
necessarily uninformed or unintelligent but rather that, at
a very basic level, they experience and interpret the world
differently. These sensory and processing differences lead
to distinct ideas for the appropriate way to organize mass-
scale social life. If the depth of these differences is accepted,
tolerance of political diversity may be enhanced in the
same fashion that recognition of the deeper, biological
bases of sexual orientation leads to greater tolerance of
homosexuality. Research in the area of biology and poli-
tics could have real-world implications and should not be
dismissed before the research is conducted.
Misconception #10: Political
Scientists Are Incapable of Utilizing
Biological Techniques and of
Appreciating Problems with These
Techniques
It is not to be denied that incorporating biological tech-
niques will entail start-up costs for political scientists, but
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these costs are more than worth it. I have heard political
scientists despair that they can never come up to the cut-
ting edge in such diverse and complicated fields as neuro-
science and molecular genetics. The good news is that the
nature of scientific research as it is practiced in most dis-
ciplines suggests that it is not necessary for us to do so.
The norm in biology is for statisticians, theoreticians, bench
scientists, technicians, and experts in the model organism
of choice, to come together to investigate the identified
research question. No one is expected to become a master
of each facet; teamwork is the key, and multiple co-authors
the norm. Our political physiology lab at the University
of Nebraska–Lincoln is fortunate in that leading geneti-
cists, neuroscientists, and endocrinologists have taken an
interest in the questions we are asking and have worked
with us as co-PIs, co-authors, and co-conspirators. The
division of labor is not without limits, however, and it is
necessary for political scientists to become conversant
enough with the approaches and issues in question to be
able to communicate effectively with others on the team
and to appreciate the pitfalls and potential of the various
techniques. Additional effort is required and coordination
across labs and disciplines is often frustrating but the
rewards of interdisciplinary work easily outweigh the
demands. If nothing else, it is exciting to learn from these
colleagues and from extant work in diverse areas.
A common approach adopted by critics of the biology
and politics movement is to point out that the biological
techniques being employed, including fMRI, EEG, elec-
trodermal activity, and molecular genetics are “controver-
sial” within the biological community. If the definition of
controversial is that scientists who question the technique
can be found somewhere, then every research technique—
including those traditionally employed in political science
(survey research, experiments, case studies, theorem prov-
ing, qualitative research)—is controversial. A similar debat-
ing approach is employed by critics of global warming
and evolution when they point out that some scientists
dispute the evidence for evolution and for human contri-
butions to global warming, thereby making these topics
“controversial.” What is the implication of this logic? Are
we to avoid any technique and disavow any concept that
is disliked or challenged by any scientist anywhere? If the
intended message is that biologically-informed tech-
niques should be used carefully, there is no argument—
though is it not the case that all research should be done
carefully?
Critics sometimes imply that political scientists are badly
out of their comfort zones in applying biological tech-
niques to politics, wandering wide-eyed into fields they
do not understand, grabbing techniques at randommerely
for the sake of trying something new, and applying them
to poorly measured phenotypes without an adequate com-
prehension of the limitations of these techniques. Though
no researcher ever knows enough, my colleagues in the
biology and politics movement are hardly naïve with regard
to the complexities and challenges involved. Rather than
making vague allusions to complexity and knowledge lev-
els, a more useful critique would focus narrowly on the
data and research designs that led to specific empirical
results in the biology and politics literature. The process
of scientific replication and extension would then be able
to correct any mistaken conclusions.
Conclusion
Theoretically, procedurally, and empirically, the biology
and politics subfield is remarkably diverse. Some research-
ers concentrate on genetics, some on neuroscience, some
on endocrinology, and some on psychophysiology.53 With
regard to theory, many individuals, including most in the
intrepid and long-suffering biopolitics group, use the con-
cepts of evolutionary psychology to guide their investiga-
tions.54 They often analyze whether humans in general
are equipped for democracy or for rational decision mak-
ing.55 In contrast, our lab (and therefore this essay) stresses
individual differences rather than overall human tenden-
cies. I do not pretend to speak for this diverse group of
colleagues and no doubt if others in the biology and pol-
itics movement had been encouraged to write this piece, it
would have a markedly different emphasis. Nonetheless, I
think there would be consensus among those in the move-
ment on the existence of the misconceptions I have
addressed and on the desire to correct them so that progress
can be made.
I respect those who question the value of using biolog-
ical concepts to better understanding political orienta-
tions and the political arena. They should continue to
speak out. But the quality of the dialogue would be
improved if they made clearer the stage at which they fall
off the wagon. Do critics believe humans are conscious of
all that is going on in their bodies relevant to stimulus
response? Might not biologically-informed techniques be
of some assistance in measuring sub-threshold forces? If
biology is not relevant to politics, do critics believe it is
relevant to any area of human behavior? If so, which ones
and why only those? Is schizophrenia partially biological?
Autism? Personality tendencies? Sexual orientations?Tastes
in food? Risk taking? Ability to remember London street
locations? The manner in which people behave around
other people? Do critics honestly believe that “biology
does not impose many constraints on social behavior” or
do they instead believe biology is relevant to many social
behaviors but not to politics? If the latter, where is the line
between social and political behaviors and why is politics
unique?
I am attracted to the study of biology and politics because
politics is the supreme test for biological explanations.
Politics as the organizing element of mass-scale social life
(rather than small-scale dominance hierarchies), after all,
is a recent and seemingly contrived addition to the human
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repertoire—more distant from biology than activities like
mating and eating. Distance, however, is not tantamount
to irrelevance. Political scientists should not continue to
remain aloof while our colleagues in neuroscience, behav-
ioral genetics, social psychology, endocrinology, neuroeco-
nomics, and biomarkers increasingly direct their attention
to the realm of politics. I encourage my disciplinary col-
leagues to become more involved in the biology and pol-
itics movement not merely as a way of defending our turf
but because I honestly believe political scientists, with their
detailed knowledge of political variations across cultures
and across people, have something very important to offer.
The relevance of biology to politics should be tested in
the caldron of science and the biology and politics move-
ment should be discarded only when the empirical evi-
dence demonstrates that biology is irrelevant and unhelpful.
Contrary to the sentiment of some critics, the movement
should not be discarded peremptorily because biology seems
irrelevant to politics—human intuitions are too woefully
inaccurate for that—and certainly should not be dis-
carded on the basis of basic misconceptions regarding the
nature of biology and of politics.
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